Dialogue as the "Dialectic of the Soul" or the "Root of Ethics"?

Autor(en)

Brigitta Keintzel

Abstrakt

Neither according to Hegel nor according to Levinas is it possible to define the person independently of collectivity. For both, dialogues play a strategic role in the orientation towards the collective. For Hegel, the “good conscience” is significant because it is a reference for describing the assumptions, and the results of a dialogue. I describe these implications in my first section. In the second section, I present Levinas’s objections to the “good conscience.” Instead of a “good conscience,” for Levinas, conscience is an instance that does not confirm the subject but accuses it. In the third section, I explore Levinas’s understanding of dialogue. In his view, dialogue resists a “priority of knowledge” and has an antecedence that points to the common origin of language and ethics. In my conclusion, I describe the resulting intersections and breaks and how a dialogue between Hegel and Levinas can be established against this background.

Organisation(en)

Institut für Philosophie, Institut für Theater-, Film- und Medienwissenschaft

Journal

Levinas Studies

Band

15

Seiten

175-202

Anzahl der Seiten

28

ISSN

1554-7000

DOI

https://doi.org/10.5840/levinas2022101021

Publikationsdatum

2021

Peer-reviewed

Ja

ÖFOS 2012

603102 Erkenntnistheorie, 603105 Geschichtsphilosophie, 603103 Ethik

Schlagwörter

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

Philosophy, Religious studies

Link zum Portal

https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/de/publications/def60986-0999-49d1-bf57-289d22a5d772